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This paper investigates the relationship between external indebtedness and 
economic growth, with a particular attention to LICs, for which the theoretical 
arguments of debt overhang and liquidity constraint have to be reconsidered. 
The estimation of a growth model, with a panel of 121 developing countries, 
supports a negative and linear relationship between past values of the NPV of 
external public debt and current economic growth. This is due to the “extended 
debt overhang”, according to which a large indebtedness leads to misallocation 
of capital and discourage long-term investment and structural reforms. This 
work underlines the critical role of economic policies and institutions, the 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Debt relief is nowadays one of the critical issues on the policy agenda of 
governments and international institutions. At the G8 summit at Gleneagles and at 
the following meetings donors and the international community agreed to further 
debt cancellation to the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), and the debate is 
now on the possibility of granting debt relief to other poor countries that might be 
included in the HIPC Initiative. The presence of a large indebtedness has different 
effects on poor countries, not only related to their macroeconomic performance, 
but also to political and institutional aspects. Nevertheless, this paper focuses 
exclusively on the economic consequences of high debts in poor countries, 
providing a re-examination of the channels through which external debt impinges 
on investment and on economic growth, in order to improve the reliability of 
policy recommendations.  
According to the debt overhang effect (Krugman, 1988 and Sachs, 1989) a 
large debt burden squeezes investments, because returns are “taxed away” by 
foreign creditors. This theoretical argument was developed in response to the 
Latin American crisis of the 1980s, which affected Middle Income countries and 
debts contracted mainly with private creditors. However, the current debt crisis 
involves Low Income countries, mainly located in Sub-Saharan African, without 
market access and highly dependant on concessional external lending. 
Notwithstanding bilateral and multilateral debt relief, they keep on receiving large 
inflows of external credit at high concessional terms by multilateral institutions. 
Hence, the lack of sudden stops in external assistance and the continuous process 
of debt rescheduling and restructuring is expected to reduce the disincentive effect 
of external public debt. The current situation seems to adapt better to an extensive 
interpretation of debt overhang, which implies a disincentive on investments in 
human capital and new technologies, and the government’s willingness to adopt 
structural reforms and fiscal adjustments, leading to a poverty trap (Sachs, 2002). 
Besides, the uncertainty associated with the level of external public debt (i.e. risk 
of default, rescheduling and arrears) increases the volatility of future inflows, 
leading to a situation in which investors are likely to exercise the “waiting” option 
(Serven, 1996). Thus, an unstable macroeconomic environment (i.e. high and 
volatile inflation and interest rates) is likely to generate a misallocation of 
resources, maybe due to short-termism, which reduces the efficiency and 
productivity of capital, leading to a slowdown of economic growth. 
Some earlier papers
1 suggest that the debt-growth relationship follows a 
bell-shaped curve, since, beyond a certain debt ratio
2, the impact of the stock of 
external debt on growth becomes negative. Two recent papers, Cordella et al. 
(2005) and Imbs and Ranciere (2005), move from the previous literature and 
extend the analysis: the former argue that the relation is a “modified Debt-Laffer 
curve” because, over a certain threshold, the debt effect on growth is nil, creating 
                                                 
1 See: Elbadawi et al. (1997), Pattillo et al. (2002 and 2004), Clements et al. (2003). 
2 The main measures of external indebtedness are the ratios of external debt over GDP and over 
exports. 
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a sort of debt irrelevance zone; the latter use a non parametric technique to 
support the bell shaped curve, arguing that better institutions reduce the 
magnitude of the debt overhang.  
Also debt flows could affect economic performance, if a reduction in 
current debt service increases the current level of investments, for any given level 
of future indebtedness (liquidity constraint effect). However, empirical findings 
on the effectiveness the crowding out of investment are debatable
3.  
In sum, the empirical evidence on the debt-growth nexus is unclear, since 
econometric results lack of robustness (Moss and Chiang, 2003). This field of 
research has to deal with the issues of omitted variables and causality, since it is 
not clear and necessary that high debt causes low growth. It could or the other 
way round, or debt and growth could be both determined by policies and 
institutions. We try to address the problem of causation taking past, instead of 
current, values of the debt ratio as explanatory variables and we include an 
institutional indicator to verify if debt has a direct effect on growth
4. 
The first contribution of this work is that we do not find any evidence of 
an inverse U-shaped curve representing the debt-growth relation. External public 
debt in the previous period is negatively associated with current economic growth, 
even controlling for  policies and institutions. A further step aims to disentangle 
the negative debt effect in Low and Middle Income countries, on the ground that 
debt overhang could be reduced or avoided in LICs thanks to the continuous 
external borrowing. Our results are not conclusive, but they suggest the possibility 
that the negative effect of debt on growth is lower in the poorest countries.  
The second contribution of the paper concerns the discussion on the 
channels through which external debt affects economic growth, The estimation of 
a total investment and a public investment equations does not find any 
relationship between external debt and investment rate, providing additional 
support to the extensive interpretation of debt overhang. A lower GDP growth is 
not due to lower, but to less efficient investment and to the lack of structural 
reforms, because of  the uncertainty and instability created by a large external 
debt. We also find that debt service obligations crowd out total (and not public) 
investment, only in Low Income countries. Thus, we could guess that debt service 
soaks up resources and reduces the credit from the banking system to private 
sector. 
Eventually, the paper underlines the great relevance of macroeconomic 
management and market oriented policies to trigger economic growth. Therefore, 
in order to reap of the benefit from a reduction in external debt, it is necessary that 
governments have the incentives to keep on pursuing structural adjustments and 
reforms. On the contrary, without conditionality, moral hazard issues could 
prevent these improvements and hinder economic growth. 
                                                 
3 Pattillo et al. (2002, 2004) do not support the liquidity constraint, while Chowdhury (2004), 
Clements et al. (2003), Elbadawi et al., (1997) and Hansen (2004) find that both debt burden and 
debt service obligations squeeze investment and economic performance. Cohen (1993), instead, 
rejects the debt overhang hypothesis and supports the crowding out effect. 
4 If the inclusion of an institutional variable does not affect the significance of the debt ratio, we 
can be more confident on the authenticity of the relationship between debt and growth. 
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The remainder of the paper is as follows: next section presents the dataset, 
its sources and its descriptive statistics in Low and Middle Income countries. 
Section 3 deals with the growth model and discusses some methodological issues 
(sub-section 3.1) and the results. Section 4 is about the investment models, while 
the last section wraps up, draws the main policy recommendations and presents 




2.  Institutional Indicators and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The dataset covers 121 developing countries over the period 1980-2004. 
The main sources are the World Development Indicators (WDI) and the Global 
Development Finance 2005 of the World Bank. Other data comes from the World 
Economic Outlook (IMF) and from a number of IMF Country Report Staff 
Papers. The historical series on the Net Present Value of Public and Public-
Guaranteed (PPG) external debt is an internal dataset of The World Bank 
constructed by Yuri Dikhanov (2004). The educational indicators – the gross 
primary and secondary enrolment rates – are constructed updating the Barro-Lee 
dataset
5 with data from the WDI 2005. To take into account the institutional 
aspect we use the Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA) score, 
which is a confidential indicator of the quality of policies and institutions 
developed by the World Bank
6. The CPIA assesses the quality of a country’s 
present policy and institutional framework. Their ratings, ranging from 1 (low) to 
6 (high), are based on all key factors that foster pro-poor growth and poverty 
alleviation (Economic Management, Structural Policies, Policies for Social 
Inclusion/Equity, Public Sector Management and Institutions). The broad 
coverage – the CPIA index is available for 136 countries – and the long time 
horizon (1977-2004) makes this indicator very useful for this panel analysis, since 
it overcome the usually lack of historical data for institutional indicators.  
To wash out any business cycle variation, we take 5 year average of the 
data, ending with 5 observations in time
7. Eventually, the plot of the data helped 
to highlight some outliers, generally related to the first observations in the former 
communist countries. 
The sample includes both Low and Middle-Income countries, so that we 
end up with an heterogeneous sample of countries, which are likely to be affected 
in different ways by debt dynamics. The summary statistics of the main variables, 
(Table 1A, in Annex A), highlight large differences between sub-samples. Middle 
Income countries are characterized by larger investment (INV) and revenues 
(REV), higher education (PEDUC and SEDUC), and stronger economic growth 
                                                 
5 http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html (last accessed: February, 2006).   
6 The datasets on the NPV of PPG external debt and on the CPIA ratings were given to the author 
when he was an intern at the PRMED (Economic Policy and Debt Department) at The World 
Bank. The author thanks L. Bandiera and V. Nehru for the provision of the data. 
7 For the education variable, instead of taking the five year average, we consider the enrolment rate 
in the first year of the 5-year period. 
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(GROWTH). The quality of policies and institutions (CPIA) is better in the richest 
countries of the sample. The level of public investment (PUBINV) is, instead, 
larger in the poorest countries, even if the difference is small. The macroeconomic 
structure in HIPCs present the worst scenario, with an average annual growth rate 
of 2.9%, lower levels of investment, education, and worse institutional quality. 
The comparison of the debt indicators shows differences even larger: the 
external debt to GDP ratio (DGDP) is 55.2 in MICs and 96.6 in LICs at nominal 
values and 35 and 59 respectively in Present Value terms (NPVDGDP). The NPV 
of debt to export ratio (NPVDXTS), which is the basic indicator implemented in 
the HIPC Initiative, is below the threshold of 150 for MICs (123.8), while it is 
above in LICs (315) and HIPCs (391). Debt service (TDSGDP), instead, is larger 
in Middle Income than in Low-Income countries (6.2% of GDP versus 4.5%). In 
the HIPCs, debt service is larger than in the overall sample of LICs, because of 
the larger stock of external debt, but still below the level reached in MICs, thanks 
to concessional lending. Nevertheless, since the crowding out effect concerns the 
budget constraint, what really matters is the share of revenues designed to repay 
debt obligations: given their poor revenues, in Low Income countries even a 
smaller debt service might crowd out investment.  
The correlation analysis (Tables 2A-3A) shows that past values of external 
debt, the variability of inflation and the exchange are significantly associated with 
lower economic growth, while public and total investment, debt service and 
education are positively related to GDP growth, even if, for education and debt 
service, the correlations are smaller and not significant in LICs. We observe a 
positive and significant correlation between the logarithm of investment (LINV) 
and debt service, revenues, CPIA, primary education, economic growth and GDP, 
both in the entire sample and in LICs, while the correlation with external debt 
ratios is generally not significant. With respect to public investments (PUBINV), 
they are positively correlated with GDP growth, revenues and the institutional 
indicator, negatively with the level of GDP, while the correlation with the external 
debt ratios is not significant.  
This brief description of the data underlines great differences in the 
macroeconomic environment between Low and Middle Income countries: in order 
to provide more reliable indications of debt effects in the poorest countries, we try 
to address the heterogeneity in the data estimating the model in different sub-
samples and also including dummies for different intercepts and slopes in LICs.  
 
 
3.  The Growth Model
8 
 
The growth equation that has to be estimated (1) is: 
 
    (1)  ()∑∑
==









1 1 ε γ δ β α
 
                                                 
8 This part is based on Presbitero (2005), who stresses the advantages of System GMM. 
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and it is equivalent to the dynamic panel model (2): 
 
    (2)  ∑∑
==









1 ε γ δ β α
 
where yit is the logarithm of per capita GDP at Purchasing Power Parity of 
country i at time t (and ∆y is the GDP growth rate calculated as log difference), 
yit-1 is the log of lagged income, xitj is a set of control variables, debtith are 
different indicators of the external public debt stocks and flows, ni captures the 
effects of the country i that are time invariant, and the classical error term εit is 
referred to the variability across time and countries. We move from the standard 
augmented Solow model (Mankiw et al. 1992) and we add debt variables – the 
logarithm of debt service and the log of the external public debt-to-GDP ratio in 
the previous period - and the institutional variable, the CPIA index. The other 
control variables are the log of investments, the log of  the primary enrolment rate, 
the rate of growth of terms of trade, and some financial indicators – the log of the 





The dynamic structure of the model
10 makes the OLS estimator upwards 
biased and inconsistent, since the lagged level of income is correlated with the 
error term. The  within transformation does not solve the problem, because of a 
downward bias (Nickel, 1981) and inconsistency. A possible solution is 
represented by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique. Blundell 
and Bond (1997) show that when β approaches to one, so that the dependent 
variable follows a path close to a random walk, the differenced-GMM (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991) has poor finite sample properties, and it is downwards biased, 
especially when T is small. Bond et al. (2001) argue that this is likely to be a 
serious issue for autoregressive model, like the growth equation (2), when the per 
capita GDP is observed in 3 or 5 years averages and T is necessarily small. 
Therefore, Blundell and Bond (1997) propose another estimator – the System-
GMM (thereafter, BB) – derived from the estimation of a system of two 
simultaneous equations, one in levels (with lagged first differences as 
instruments) and the other in first differences (with lagged levels as instruments). 
In multivariate dynamic panel models, the BB estimator is shown to perform 
better than the differenced-GMM when series are persistent (β close to unity) and 
there is a dramatic reduction in the finite sample bias due to the exploitation of 
additional moment conditions (Blundell et al. 2000). In presence of 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, the two-step System-GMM uses a 
                                                 
9 The exchange rate is defined as national currency per US dollar, while the variability of inflation 
- defined as the standard deviation of inflation in the five-year period - could be thought as a 
measure of macroeconomic instability.  
10 We present the methodological issues referring to the growth model, since they can be easily 
extended at the investment equation, discussed in section 4. 
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consistent estimate of the weighting matrix, taking the residuals from the one-step 
estimate (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004). Though asymptotically more 
efficient, the two-step GMM presents estimates of the standard errors that tend to 
be severely downward biased. However, it is possible to solve this problem using 
the finite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix derived by 
Windmeijer, which can make two-step robust GMM estimates more efficient than 
one-step robust ones, especially for system GMM (Roodman, 2003). 
Bond et al. (2001) provide a useful insight in the GMM estimation of 
dynamic growth models
11, arguing that the pooled OLS and the LSDV estimators 
should be considered respectively as the upper and lower bound. As a result, 
whether the differenced GMM coefficient is close to or lower than the within 
group one, this is likely a sign that the estimates are biased downward (maybe 
because of a weak instrument problem). Thus, if this is the case, the use of 
System-GMM is highly recommended, and its estimates should lie between OLS 
and LSDV. This conclusion is supported by the empirical testing of the 
augmented Solow model (Hoeffler, 2002 and Nkurunziza and Bates, 2002). 
Presbitero (2005) estimates a model similar to (2) showing that the System-GMM 
is a good estimator, at least better than the differenced-GMM, which is severely 
downward biased. In particular, there is evidence that using results obtained with 
the System GMM confirm that: 
•  the system-GMM lies between the upper and lower bound 
represented by OLS and LSDV, 
•  there is a gain in efficiency, and 





The results (Table 1) are consistent with the augmented Solow model, 
showing conditional convergence and a positive effect of education and 
investment on economic growth. Terms of trade have generally a positive impact 
too, while openness is not significant. The higher the volatility of the inflation 
rate, the more unstable is the macroeconomic environment and the lower is the 
growth rate. Policies and institutions have a strong impact on growth, since a one 
point increase in the CPIA score is associated with an increase in GDP growth of 
around 1.3 percentage points. The estimates support the existence of a negative 
relation between the past debt values and current growth, while debt service is not 
significant. We check and validate this relevant results with different debt 
indicators – face and discounted values and their ratios over GDP and exports
13.  
                                                 
11 One of the main problems of using the GMM estimators with macroeconomic and cross country 
data is that they are generally developed for micro data, in which the spatial dimension is very 
large, and their properties are valid asymptotically. 
12 Whether these three conditions are met, the two-step system-GMM results can be taken as a 
benchmark for growth regressions (Bond et al., 2001, 2004, Nkurunzita and Bates, 2003, Hoeffler, 
2002).  
13 The last two columns of Table 1 report the estimates obtained using current instead of past 
values of the debt ratio: the linear negative relationship is still significant and its magnitude is 
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Table 1: The Growth Model: different debt indicators 
 
Dependent variable:  
GDP growth  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP  (-1)  -1.68** -1.38** -1.77** -1.50** -2.69** -2.45** 
    (0.41) (0.46) (0.39) (0.53) (0.54) (0.48) 
NPVDGDP (-1)  -0.83**                
   (0.31)                
NPVDXTS (-1)     -0.45*             
      (0.27)             
DGDP (-1)        -0.91**          
         (0.37)          
DXTS (-1)           -0.34       
            (0.34)       
DGDP              -0.99**    
               (0.51)    
DXTS                 -1.10** 
                  (0.45) 
LTDSGDP  0.48 -0.15 0.27 -0.27  2.12**  2.43** 
    (0.53) (0.55) (0.54) (0.57) (0.67) (0.75) 
LINV  2.67** 2.40** 2.68** 2.46** 4.18** 4.36** 
    (0.85) (0.95) (0.87) (0.88) (1.27) (1.00) 
PEDUC  3.83** 3.52** 3.68** 3.54** 3.10**  2.40* 
    (1.35) (1.48) (1.37) (1.29) (1.30) (1.40) 
TOT 0.06**  0.06**  0.05**  0.05*  0.04  0.04 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
OPEN  -0.60 -0.67 -0.73 -0.42 -0.89  -2.44** 
    (0.75) (0.77) (0.68) (0.88) (0.92) (1.04) 
INFL -0.0004** -0.0005** -0.0005** -0.0005** -0.0003 -0.0002 
    (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
CPIA  1.23** 1.29** 1.31** 1.38** 0.81** 0.94** 
    (0.30) (0.30) (0.32) (0.30) (0.39) (0.34) 
CONSTANT  -8.15 -7.80 -5.31 -8.52 -1.67 6.38 
    (6.72) (7.60) (6.91) (7.99) (6.19) (8.40) 
                    
OIR test (p-value)  0.374 0.321 0.366 0.367 0.499  0.578
AB(1) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.020 0.002  0.002
AB(2) 0.917 0.998 0.918 0.967 0.859  0.900
No. Obs.  410 405 409 412 427  421
No. Obs. Per group  3.42 3.38 3.41 3.43 3.56  3.51
F-test 14.64 18.77 15.4 17.46 28.29  21.07
Notes: All variables are five-year average. Double and stars mean respectively a 5% and 10% 
significance level. Corrected standard errors are in brackets. Time dummies not shown. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
larger. Since column 1 is the preferred specification, thereafter we take the NPV of external public 
debt-to-GDP ratio as main debt indicator. 
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All the specifications pass the Hansen-J statistic test for Over-Identifying 
Restrictions (OIR), confirming that the instrument set can be considered valid, the 
F-test for the overall significance of the regression and the Arellano-Bond tests for 
serial correlation
14, supporting the model specification. The main findings on the 
debt-growth nexus do not change if we exclude some variables or if we control for 
secondary education or for the exchange rate
15.  
The estimation of the growth equation without the investment variable 
shows that the exclusion of investment does not increase substantially the debt 
effect, since the coefficients on debt are not statistically different comparing 
columns 1 and 2 in Tables 1 and 2. Therefore, external indebtedness is not a 
constraint to the level of investment. Lower growth, thus, could be explained by a 
misallocation of resources, with agents preferring less efficient investment 
project, because of uncertainty and short-termism, in accord with an extensive 
interpretation of debt overhang. Eventually, there is no evidence of a bell shaped 
relation between debt and growth: the inclusion of the quadratic term in the 
preferred specification (column 6), in fact, does not change the impact of other 
variables on economic growth, but makes the debt ratios no more significant. In 
particular, we are able to show how the presence of the Debt-Laffer curve depends 
on the exclusion of the institutional control and on the use of current debt ratios 
(column 3). Nonetheless, the inclusion of the CPIA score (column 4) or the use of 
past instead of current debt ratios (column 5) makes the Debt-Laffer curve not 
significant. 
The estimation of the debt growth nexus in the entire sample may not be 
very informative because of the heterogeneity of the countries analyzed. A first 
strategy to address this problem is the estimation of the model for the two sub-
samples, allowing all the explanatory variables to have different effects on 
economic growth. An alternative consists in taking into account the specificity of 
LICs, allowing only for a shift of the regression line (including of a dummy for 
the LICs) and for a change in the coefficient on debt, using an interaction term 
constructed multiplying the LIC dummy with the debt variable (always related to 
the previous period). Thus, model (2) becomes: 
 
       (3)  () ∑
=
− + + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + + ⋅ + =
k
j
it i t t itj j it it n LIC LIC debt debt x y y
1





                                                 
14 If the model is well specified we expect to reject the null of not autocorrelation of the first order 
(AB1), and to not reject the hypothesis of no autocorrelation of the second order (AB2). 
15 Secondary enrolment rate is a positive and significant determinant of the growth rate, while the 
change in the log of the exchange rate has a negative impact on GDP growth. In other words, a 
devaluation of the exchange rate reduces economic growth, according to a recent contribution by 
Frankel (2005), who stresses the contractionary effects of devaluation in developing countries, 
mainly due to balance sheet effects on financial sector. Results are not shown for reason of space 
and available from the author on request. 
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Table 2: The Growth Model: without investment and non-linearities. 
 
Dependent variable:      
GDP growth  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
-1.34** -1.13** -3.32** -2.50** -2.43** -1.71**  GDP (-1) 
(0.58) (0.66) (0.70) (0.54) (0.45) (0.42) 
-0.83**           0.09  -0.35  NPVDGDP (-1) 
(0.31)           (0.98)  (0.91) 
            -0.20  -0.07  [NPVDGDP (-1)]^2 
            (0.14)  (0.13) 
   -0.44**              NPVDXTS (-1) 
   (0.27)             
NPVDGDP        3.08*  2.39       
         (1.77)  (2.22)       
      -0.66**  -0.48*        [NPVDGDP]^2 
      (0.24)  (0.28)       
LTDSGDP  0.51 0.22  3.27**  1.89**  1.38**  0.45 
   (0.69) (0.72) (0.80) (0.61) (0.51) (0.46) 
LINV        4.31**  3.54**  3.69**  2.48** 
         (0.98)  (1.09)  (0.87)  (0.75) 
PEDUC  5.30**  4.97  5.24** 4.03** 5.25** 4.10** 
   (1.63) (1.59) (1.74) (1.41) (1.36) (1.37) 
TOT  0.06** 0.05  0.00  0.03  0.05*  0.05** 
   (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
OPEN  -0.06 -0.22 -1.39 -0.95 -0.30 -0.50 
   (0.90) (0.97) (0.87) (0.85) (0.72) (0.73) 
INFL -0.0005** -0.0006** -0.0002 -0.0002  -0.0005**  -0.0004**
   (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
CPIA  1.24**  1.32**     0.76*     1.25** 
   (0.32)  (0.31)    (0.42)    (0.31) 
CONSTANT  -11.92  -11.74 -8.51 -10.18  -11.92*  -9.68 
    (8.80) (9.50) (8.00) (6.71) (6.44) (6.77) 
                    
OIR test (p-value)  0.428 0.372 0.329 0.448 0.430  0.402
AB(1) 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.002 0.004  0.003
AB(2) 0.638 0.749 0.650 0.698 0.981  0.938
No. Obs.  410 405 438 427 417  410
No. Obs. Per group  3.42 3.38 3.65 3.56 3.48  3.42
F-test 10.42 12.2 12.08 14.13 22.11  19.3
Notes: All variables are five-year average. Double and stars mean respectively a 5% and 10% 
significance level. Corrected standard errors are in brackets. Time dummies not shown. 
 
 
We want to test if φ is different from zero, so that in LICs external debt effect has 
effectively a different magnitude than in the overall sample. Besides, we can test 
the joint hypothesis: 
 
H0: φ = 0 and ρ = 0 
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If we cannot reject the null, we can conclude that the heterogeneity of the data is 
already explained by all the other covariates, so that we could be more confident 
on the relation between past debt and current growth. 
Table 3 shows the results obtained following the first strategy
16. In the first 
two columns, we estimate the model over the entire sample, allowing for a shift in 
the intercept, which embed the slower rate of growth in LICs. All the other 
explanatory variables keep their signs and they are still significant, even if the 
inclusion of the secondary enrolment rate is preferable with respect to the usual 
measure of primary education. The estimation of the debt-growth nexus separately 
for Low and Middle Income countries underlines the differences in the two 
samples: as expected, economic growth is more volatile in the poorest countries, 
where primary education is the best proxy of human capital; in market access 
economies, instead, GDP is more path dependant and the secondary enrolment 
rate is more informative. The role of institutions and policies is strong and similar 
in both countries. The comparison between columns 2 and 6 suggests that external 
debt  is a harsher constraint to economic growth in MICs than in the overall 
sample
17. However, there is no support of debt overhang and the exclusion of 
investment reduces (in absolute terms) the coefficient from 0.98 to 0.91, 
suggesting a positive correlation between external debt and investment, as 
supported also by the investment model estimated in the next section
18. On the 
other hand, in the poorest countries we observe a reduction of the debt effect, 
which is not always significant. Nonetheless, the point estimates are lower than in 
the overall sample and in MICs
19, suggesting the existence of a sort of debt 
irrelevance zone. 
The inclusion of both the LIC dummy and the interaction term between the 
dummy and past values of the debt ratio (Table 4) does not provide any evidence 
of a significant difference in the effect of external debt on GDP growth between 
Low and Middle Income countries. Point estimates on the debt ratio remain pretty 
stable and negative, and also all the other explanatory variables are significant and 
with the expected signs. The dummy for LICs and the interaction term are never 
significant, so that we cannot reject the null of both of them jointly equal to zero. 
In other words, since the heterogeneity of data is already embedded in the 
variability of the other covariates, we can be more confident on our previous 




                                                 
16 We have dropped the openness indicator, which is found not to be a significant determinant of 
GDP growth in previous regressions. 
17 The debt coefficient increases (in absolute terms) from 0.61 to 0.98. A similar result is 
observable comparing column 1 and 5. 
18 Results not shown for reason of space. 
19 In particular, if we estimate the model of column 4 on the entire sample, we find that the 
coefficient on the debt ratio is -0.95. Larger standard errors could be due to reduced sample size. 
Moreover, since the debt effect is larger in MICs than in the entire sample, it is reasonable to 
assume that it should be lower in LICs. 
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Table 3: Growth Equation, Low and Middle Income countries. 
 
Dependent variable:        
GDP growth  ALL ALL LIC  LIC MIC MIC 
GDP  (-1)  -3.19** -3.10** -3.79** -4.78** -2.50** -3.32** 
    (0.88) (0.82) (1.09) (1.46) (0.82) (0.84) 
NPVDGDP  (-1)  -0.95**  -0.61* -0.51 -0.83*  -1.17**  -0.98** 
    (0.30) (0.34) (0.45) (0.44) (0.34) (0.33) 
LIC   -3.03**  -2.51**             
   (1.42)  (1.26)             
LTDSGDP 0.33  0.17  -0.72      0.78  1.06* 
   (0.58)  (0.58)  (0.98)     (0.74)  (0.62) 
LINV 2.22**  2.86**  2.30**  2.57**  1.88  2.76** 
    (0.84) (0.91) (0.83) (0.87) (1.46) (0.94) 
PEDUC  2.49     4.07**  3.47**  1.36    
   (1.68)     (1.65)  (1.38)  (2.61)    
SEDUC     1.35*           2.25** 
      (0.75)           (0.65) 
TOT  0.06**  0.05** 0.02  0.04  0.07* 0.07* 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
INFL  -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0003 
    (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
CPIA  1.20** 1.12** 1.12** 1.09** 1.30** 1.07** 
    (0.27) (0.24) (0.43) (0.55) (0.38) (0.27) 
CONSTANT  10.75 13.59*  4.34  12.45  11.07 11.88* 
    (12.46) (7.74)  (9.35) (10.11)  (12.89) (6.23) 
                    
OIR test (p-value)  0.434 0.219 1.000 0.997 0.877  0.949
AB(1) 0.003 0.004 0.048 0.053 0.009  0.009
AB(2) 0.978 0.733 0.915 0.848 0.942  0.588
No. Obs.  410 406 186 186 224  221
No. Obs. Per group  3.42 3.41 3.65 3.65 3.25  3.25
F-test 16.7 11.47 8.05 8.7 11.8  10.93
Notes: All variables are five-year average. Double and stars mean respectively a 5% and 10% 
significance level. Corrected standard errors are in brackets. Time dummies not shown. 
 
 
Therefore, whether the target of the analysis are exclusively the poorest 
countries of the sample, we are not able to draw strong conclusions, even if it 
seems that the negative relation is still valid, although the magnitude might be 
lower and its significance need to be addressed carefully. Eventually, the 
possibility that external debt is not significantly partially correlated with GDP 
growth could be in line with the idea of the presence of a debt irrelevance zone 






Table 4: Growth Equation, Interaction term and LIC dummy. 
 
Dependent variable:              
GDP growth  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP  (-1)  -2.82** -2.91** -2.95** -2.77** 
    (1.02) (0.80) (0.83) (0.74) 
NPVDGDP  (-1)  -1.00** -0.54 -0.93**  -0.86* 
    (0.41) (0.45) (0.39) (0.43) 
[NPVDGDP  (-1)]*LIC  -0.05 -0.19 -0.05 -0.02 
    (0.55) (0.66) (0.49) (0.51) 
LIC  -2.23 -1.52 -2.43 -2.11 
    (2.65) (2.65) (2.23) (2.12) 
LTDSGDP  0.34 0.25 0.58 0.71 
    (0.51) (0.54) (0.51) (0.48) 
LINV  2.12** 2.88** 2.32** 2.09** 
    (0.80) (0.75) (0.80) (0.84) 
OPEN        -0.96  -1.12 
         (0.68)  (0.75) 
PEDUC 2.97*      3.48**  4.50** 
   (1.77)     (1.55)  (1.11) 
SEDUC     1.51**       
      (0.70)       
TOT 0.06**  0.05**  0.05**  0.05* 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
INFL -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003     
   (0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.0002)    
RER           -0.33 
            (0.22) 
CPIA  1.18** 1.06** 1.16** 0.95** 
    (0.27) (0.23) (0.28) (0.31) 
CONSTANT  6.08 11.26 7.73  3.95 
   (14.70)  (7.89)  (10.53)  (8.73) 
              
OIR test (p-value)  0.413 0.223 0.422  0.31
AB(1) 0.003 0.004 0.003  0.003
AB(2) 0.995 0.686 0.964  0.394
No. Obs.  410 406 410  406
No. Obs. Per group  3.42 3.41 3.42  3.41
Test LIC (p-value)  0.233 0.175 0.054  0.188
F-test 12.64 9.82 11.06  11.75
Notes: All variables are five-year average. Double and stars mean respectively a 5% and 10% 
significance level. Corrected standard errors are in brackets. Time dummies not shown. Test LIC 




To have an idea of the growth impact of debt relief, we estimate that, 
according to different specifications of the model, a 10% reduction in the debt 
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ratio will foster per capita GDP growth by 0.08-0.1 percentage points
20. A 
previous reduction in the discounted debt ratio from 50 to 30, similar to what 
happened in Bolivia in the last decade, is associated with an increase of almost 
half percentage point in current GDP growth. This effect is not really large, but it 
is reasonable to assume that debt reduction has other positive effect on the 
macroeconomic environment, so that it could be the source of other positive 
contribution to economic growth. 
 
 
4.  The Investment Model 
 
The estimation of the debt-growth relationship is instructive in order to 
understand if larger indebtedness is associated with slower economic growth, but 
it is not really informative about the channels through which this could happen. In 
order to have a more reliable picture of debt constraints on the economy, we look 
at the effects of external debt on public and total investment and we try to 
disentangle different effects in Low and Middle Income countries. We specify a 
very simple dynamic model – equation (4) – in which the investment rate yit 
depends on its past value yit-1 and on a set of control and debt variables (xitj and 
debtith): 
 
    (4)  ∑∑
==









1 ε γ δ β α
 
In order to keep the model as simple as possible, we include some basic control 
variables: the growth rate of GDP (GROWTH), which captures the “accelerator 
effect” (Agenor, 2005)
21, the revenues rate (REV), the institutional quality index 
(CPIA), private investment (PRINV, only in the public investment model), a 
dummy for LICs (column 1 and 4), and the time dummies to control for 
exogenous shock related to business cycle. We exclude the measure of aid, 
because the revenues already includes grants, and the standard indicator of 
openness (trade over GDP), because of its high correlation with revenues, 
especially in LICs, where a large share of tax revenues comes from tariffs
22. 
The estimates show a strong and significant crowding out of total 
investment in Low Income countries (Table 5), while there is no evidence that 
debt obligations reduce the level of investment in MICs. The stock of external 
debt, in present value terms, in positively associated with total investment, even if 
                                                 
20 Following the preferred specification in the first column of Table 4, the elasticity of GDP 
growth with respect to the NPV of external debt to GDP ratio is -0.27. 
21 A better specification of the investment model should consider also the variability of the real 
exchange rate and of inflation, which capture the macroeconomic instability better than the level of 
inflation. Further research will include those variables in order to capture the importance of 
uncertainty on investment and economic growth. 
22 The correlation between revenues and openness is 0.47 in the entire sample and 0.61 in LICs. 
Nevertheless, we have run regressions including openness, without finding it a significant 
determinant of investment. 
 14 
it is generally not significant, so that we do not find empirical evidence of debt 
overhang, even focusing on LIC and MIC. The other control variables included in 
the model are significant and with the expected sign: revenues, institutional 
quality and economic growth boost investments, which depend also on investment 
in the previous period (the autoregressive term explains half of current 
investment). Eventually, the results pass the tests of autocorrelation and over-
identifying restrictions and are very similar controlling for the nominal and NPV 
of debt ratios to GDP and exports and for the presence of non linearity
23.  
 
Table 5: Total Investment Equation 
 
Dependent variable:          
Total Investment 
All 
sample  LIC MIC All 
sample  LIC MIC 
INV  (-1)  0.49** 0.50** 0.33** 0.50** 0.50** 0.37** 
   (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.00) 
NPVDGDP (-1)  0.88**  0.20  0.59          
   (0.42)  (0.54)  (0.53)          
NPVDXTS (-1)           0.39  0.19  0.44 
            (0.35)  (0.52)  (0.36) 
LTDSGDP -0.21  -0.38**  0.09  -0.17  -0.36*  0.10 
   (0.13) (0.16) (0.14) (0.12) (0.19) (0.11) 
REV  0.31** 0.32**  0.15*  0.37** 0.29** 0.19** 
   (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.09) 
GROWTH  0.36**  0.36** 0.20 0.33** 0.39  0.15 
   (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.26) (0.15) 
CPIA  0.86* 1.95**  0.46  0.83* 2.22**  0.59 
   (0.51) (0.74) (0.59) (0.44) (0.95) (0.58) 
LIC -0.16      0.11     
  (0.81)    (0.69)    
CONSTANT  -1.66 -4.05 6.90* -2.19 -3.59 4.77 
   (2.59 (2.54) (3.91) (2.89) (4.32) (3.84) 
                    
OIR test (p-value)  0.120 0.999 0.674 0.491 0.996  0.814
AB(1) 0.005 0.105 0.027 0.007 0.086  0.018
AB(2) 0.276 0.297 0.689 0.245 0.280  0.750
No. Obs.  391 176 215 386 174  212
No. Obs. Per group  3.49 3.74 3.31 3.45 3.7  3.26
F-test 12.03 25.42 3.83 16.31 27.60  7.07
Notes: All variables are five-year average. Double and stars mean respectively a 5% and 10% 
significance level. Corrected standard errors are in brackets. Time dummies not shown. 
 
 
On average, a one percent increase in the debt service to GDP ratio 
reduces the total investment rate by almost 0.4 percentage points in Low Income 
                                                 
23 We have included a quadratic term in order to control for the presence of a sort of Debt-Laffer 
curve, without finding any significant evidence. Results not shown for the sake of brevity and 
available from the author on request. 
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countries. It is worth noting the sensitivity on investment to economic policies, 
but only in LICs, where a one point upward shift in the CPIA score add about 2 
percentage points to the investment rate. In MICs, the institutional indicator is not 
significant, suggesting that, probably, over a certain threshold, institutions and 
policies are no more likely to boost investment. This result underlines the 
relevance that should be given to economic and structural reforms in the poorest 
countries, in order to grant a minimum level of economic management to trigger 
investment and economic growth. 
The analysis of the determinants of public investments shows a different 
picture (Table 6). Public investment are more path dependant in MICs than in 
LICs, which are affected by the variability of external finance, revenues and 
foreign assistance. Public and private investments (PRINV) are substitutes, both 
in Low and Middle income countries, suggesting that governments should 
increase the kind of investments, as infrastructure, which boost private 
investments. We do not find any evidence of liquidity constraint and debt 
overhang, even controlling for the possible presence of non-linearities
24, both in 
Low and Middle Income countries. Large debts in the previous period are 
associated with subsequent higher investment ratios in the public sector only in 
market access economies, in accordance with the estimates of the growth 
equation, in which the exclusion of investment reduces the debt coefficient. This 
finding could be consistent with the idea that debt spurs public investment until a 
certain threshold, above which its positive effect vanishes, even if it is not only 
the level of indebtedness which affect government decisions, but also the 
specificity of macroeconomic structure, institutions, and economic policies.  
The comparison between the effects of external debt in MICs between 
public and total investment shows that a large external debt-to-GDP ratios in the 
previous period is significantly associated with current higher public investment 
but not with larger total investment. This finding suggests that debt overhang 
might be a valid theory for private agents, who, because of the uncertainty due to 
a large indebtedness, prefer to postpone or give up their projects
25.  
The crowding out effect is limited to total investment in LICs, where, even 
considering the concessionality of external lending, interest payments on external 
debt are a constraint in the poorest because of their weak fiscal system. The fact 
that debt service does not reduce public investment, but total investment might 
seem counterintuitive, because service payments impinge on the budget 
constraint. However, the crowding out of private investment could be explained 
by the real cost of financing faced by private sector and by a credit squeeze 
associated with situation of debt distress, so that the banking system lends to the 
government in order to meet external obligations and cannot finance the private 
sector. In market access economies, instead, private investors can more easily 
                                                 
24 We have also controlled the robustness of the estimates using debt ratios to GDP and exports, in 
nominal and Present Value terms. Estimates not shown for reasons of space and available from the 
author on request. 
25 This indications have to be taken with caution, since the point estimate of the debt coefficient in 
the total investment equation is still positive and close to the one on public investment, even if not 
significant. 
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have access to international market and the dependence of banking system on 
government is lower.  
 
Table 6: Public Investment Equation 
 
Dependent variable:              
Public Investment  All sample  LIC  MIC 
PUBINV (-1)  0.42**  0.36**  0.46** 
   (0.09) (0.11)  (0.11) 
NPVDGDP (-1)  0.48  -0.29  0.85** 
   (0.34) (0.66)  (0.28) 
TDSGDP -0.07  -0.20  0.02 
   (0.07) (0.16)  (0.07) 
PRINV -0.07  -0.18**  -0.19** 
 (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.07) 
REV 0.26**  0.27**  0.13** 
   (0.07) (0.06)  (0.06) 
GROWTH 0.13**  0.15**  0.13 
   (0.05) (0.07)  (0.10) 
CPIA 0.79**  1.29*  0.70 
   (0.32) (0.73)  (0.42) 
LIC 1.88**     
 (0.63)     
CONSTANT -4.97**  -1.62  -2.84 
   (1.49) (2.26)  (2.93) 
           
OIR test (p-value)  0.560 1.000  0.988
AB(1) 0.007 0.044  0.032
AB(2) 0.691 0.841  0.640
No. Obs.  360 168  192
No. Obs. Per group  3.36 3.65  3.15
F-test 15.04 10.69  23.45
Notes: All variables are five-year average. Double and stars mean respectively a 5% and 10% 
significance level. Corrected standard errors are in brackets. Time dummies not shown. 
 
 
The presence of liquidity constraint in LICs stresses the potential future 
risks related to a rising domestic debt in many HIPC countries. The stock of 
public domestic debt is still generally low, but interest payments are larger than on 
domestic than on external public debt
26. As a consequence, domestic debt is likely 
to become a serious constraint to economic growth and poverty reduction in LICs, 
soaking up resources for investment and pro-poor and social spending 
 
                                                 
26 For a discussion of the dynamics and potential risks for economic growth and debt sustainability 
of Central Government securitized domestic debt in HIPC, see Arnone et al. (2006). They show 
the rapid increase in debt stocks and in interest payments, which, in the last years, soak up budget 
resources than external debt service. 
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5.  Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
 
This analysis extends and deepens the study of the debt-growth nexus, 
taking into account the role of institutions and disentangling the debt effects on 
public and total investment, with a particular attention to Low Income countries. 
Using past instead of current values of the debt ratio we confirm the presence of a 
negative and linear relation between external debt and growth, even controlling 
for institutional quality, so that external indebtedness is effectively correlated with 
lower growth. The role of macroeconomic policies is found to be essential for 
economic growth, supporting the adoption of selectivity and conditionality in debt 
relief programs. Thus, international institutions and local government should 
encourage structural reforms and market oriented policies, in order to reap the 
benefits from external assistance and debt reduction.  
Our findings suggest that external debt does not reduce the level of 
investment, but the “extended debt overhang” effect works in terms of 
misallocation of capital, short-termism, lack of structural reforms, and subsequent 
lower efficiency. Debt service crowds out total investment in LICs, while there is 
no evidence of a liquidity constraint in Middle Income countries. This result must 
be carefully taken into account, because the rapid increase in domestic debt in 
Low Income countries in the last years is associated with soaring interest rates and 
results in interest payments on domestic debt larger than on external debt. With 
respect to the presence of a Debt-Laffer curve, the paper argues that the basic 
relation between debt and growth is negative. However, we recognize that this 
link could become less strong or even not significant when debt is too large, so 
that there might be a debt irrelevance zone. The upward sloping part of the curve, 
instead, is not validated by the data, coherently with the reasonable assumption 
that rich and industrialized countries are the ones which occupy that portion of the 
bell curve. A careful estimation, based on total public debt and on a complete 
sample of countries, may provide evidence of a Debt-Laffer curve. 
From a policy perspective, this work underlines the lack of theoretical and 
empirical grounds of the debt thresholds embedded in the HIPC Initiative, because 
of the linear relation between past external debt and current growth. The positive 
and strong impact of the institutional indicator requires to give great emphasis on 
economic policies, governance and structural reforms in poor countries. The 
presence of an actual liquidity constraint calls forth some sort of debt service 
threshold in the HIPC Initiative and it highlights the possible future risks of 
domestic debt in poor countries. Eventually, debt relief could trigger economic 
growth, even if its direct effect seems to be limited. However, reduced uncertainty 
and instability, together with an increased confidence on the countries which 
received debt relief could bring additional benefits in terms of investment and 
growth. If debt reduction goes hand in hand with selectivity and structural and 
economic adjustments, it could be viewed as a positive signal from the 
international community, so that this sort of “endorsement” may stimulate foreign 
investment, macroeconomic stability and economic growth.  
Eventually, we recognize that this topic requires further research. In 
particular, domestic debt should included in the analysis to validate the impression 
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that domestic debt service is becoming an harsh constraint on government in 
LICs. Then, in order to have a broader and more complete picture of debt effects 
on the economy, its impact on government expenditures should be analyzed, so 
that we can look at the possibility of a crowding out effect and also at the 
existence of a positive relation between debt and expenditures, providing 
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Annex A: List of Variables 
 
Variable Definition  Source 
    
GDP  Logarithm of per capita GDP, measured at 
Purchasing Power Parity. 
The World Bank 
GROWTH  GDP growth rate, calculated as log difference.  The World Bank 
NPVDGDP  Logarithm of the Net Present Value of PPG 
external debt-to-GDP ratio. 
The World Bank, 
Dikhanov (2004) 
NPVDXTS  Logarithm of the Net Present Value of PPG 
external debt-to-exports ratio. 
The World Bank, 
Dikhanov (2004) 
DGDP  Logarithm of PPG external debt-to-GDP ratio.  The World Bank 
DXTS  Logarithm of PPG external debt-to-exports ratio.  The World Bank 
LTDSGDP  Logarithm of Total Debt Service-to-GDP ratio.  The World Bank 
TDSGDP  Total Debt Service-to-GDP ratio.  The World Bank 
LINV  Logarithm of Gross Fixed Capital Formation, as 
percentage of GDP. 
The World Bank and 
IMF 
INV  Gross Fixed Capital Formation, as percentage of 
GDP. 
The World Bank and 
IMF 
PUBINV  Total Gross Public Capital Formation, as 
percentage of GDP. 
The World Bank and 
IMF 
PRINV  Total Gross Private Capital Formation, as 
percentage of GDP. 
The World Bank and 
IMF 
REV  Central Government Total Revenues, including 
grants, as percentage of GDP. 
The World Bank and 
IMF 
PEDUC  Logarithm of Gross Primary Enrolment Rate, in 
the first year of the 5-year period. 
The World Bank and 
Barro-Lee dataset 
SEDUC  Logarithm of Gross Secondary Enrolment Rate, 
in the first year of the 5-year period. 
The World Bank and 
Barro-Lee dataset 
TOT  The growth rate of the Terms of Trade.  The World Bank and 
IMF 
OPEN  Logarithm of openness, defined as Exports plus 
Imports over GDP. 
The World Bank 
INFL  Standard Deviation of Inflation (consumer price) 
over the five-year period. 
The World Bank and 
IMF 
RER  Logarithm of the change in the real exchange 
rate, defined as national currency per US dollar. 
The World Bank 
CPIA  Country Policy and Institutional Assessments 
score. 
The World Bank 
LIC  Dummy for Low Income Countries, according to 
the GDF classification. 
The World Bank 
    
Notes: All variables, except PEDUC, SEDUC and LIC, are five-year averages 
  
Annex B: Tables 
 
 
Table 1A: Summary Statistics 
 
      GROWTH  DXTS  DGDP  NPVDGDP NPVDXTS TDSGDP  INV  PUBINV REV  PEDUC  SEDUC  CPIA 
                                         
MIC  Mean  4.210465 194.0707 55.19176 35.42635 123.8681 6.182921 22.97128 7.251964 24.96846 103.616 64.09186 3.606392 
    Median  4.343414 151.3348 44.85499 25.3587 87.85905 5.531419 22.15975 5.925061 23.28295 103.3027 66.72 3.6375 
   Sd. Dev. 4.095351  248.4029 48.09289 33.75073 178.5734 4.443062  7.166159 4.891902 9.899317 15.43577 24.61565 0.789402 
    obs.  327 303 308 313 308 308 330 296 317 338 329 295 
                                         
HIPC Mean  2.936606 650.2239 122.4667 75.40727 390.935 5.216383 17.32015 8.062695 19.32867 76.54697 22.04934 3.097056 
    Median  3.184185 453.3207 100.5347 58.16979 259.4368 3.995039 16.20101 7.013128 18.47676 74.836 17.5025 3.1865 
   Sd. Dev. 3.175678  592.7778 88.40223 68.68234 439.436 4.645291  7.180072 5.236216 7.272531 27.35326 17.5202 0.685727 
    obs.  170 166 168 168 166 168 170 166 165 169 161 169 
                                         
LIC Mean  3.21908 527.801 96.63205 59.32402 315.3279 4.460259  18.62104 8.124525 19.43138 80.84227 28.55437 3.110183 
   Median  3.771996  362.944 78.19771 44.11967 195.845 3.591579  17.01445 6.99377 18.09523 78.94 21.44 3.205 
   Sd. Dev. 3.992074  545.45 75.69175 59.26672 394.1437 3.642276  8.446576 6.243141 8.620467 26.19487 23.7435 0.647655 
    obs.  248 235 237 237 235 237 248 233 232 247 239 237 
                                         
Total Mean  3.782876 339.8451 73.21258 45.72407 206.7282 5.4338 21.10474 7.636287 22.62856 94.00044 49.13859 3.385337 
   Median  4.061909  227.011 57.10055 32.28211 135.2018 4.339733  20.20491 6.642166 21.24626 99.548 46.82333 3.429125 
   Sd. Dev. 4.077347  437.9443 64.91199 47.93343 306.8339 4.198369  8.029097 5.539364 9.763646 23.52167 29.92494 0.769668 
    obs.  575 538 545 550 543 545 578 529 549 585 568 532 
 
Notes: The debt ratios (NPVDGDP and NPVDXTS) refer to the original ratios, not to the logarithms. 
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Table 2A: Pairwise correlations, entire sample 
All sample  GROWTH  GDP(-1)  LTDSGDP  NPVDXTS 
(-1) 
NPVDGDP 
(-1)  LINV PUBINV  PEDUC  TOT  REV  RER  INFL  CPIA 
1                         
GROWTH 
575                        
-0.0192  1                    
GDP(-1) 
455  459                    
0.1807*  0.2502*  1                  
LTDSGDP 
542  450  545                  
-0.1860*  -0.4176*  0.0451 1                
NPVDXTS(-1) 
422  424  423 424                
-0.2058*  -0.2131*  0.2863* 0.8260* 1              
NPVDGDP(-1) 
427  429  428 423 429              
0.2704*  0.2587*  0.1923* -0.1716* -0.0241 1             
LINV 
573  458  544 423 428 578             
0.2058*  -0.1839*  -0.048 0.0347 0.0543 0.4321* 1          
PUBINV 
527  430  510 405 409 528 529          
0.1310*  0.4793*  0.1444* -0.2156* -0.0932 0.3256* -0.0301  1        
PEDUC 
559 453 535 420 425 563 517 584            
-0.0522 0.0512  -0.1243* -0.0538 -0.0277 0.0226 0.0031 0.0225 1          
TOT 
570 455 540 420 425 573 524 579 598          
0.0834 0.2447* 0.1727* -0.2547* 0.010 0.4428* 0.3673* 0.0956* -0.0093 1        
REV 
532 427 509 396 401 533 489 535 547 552        
-0.4656* 0.0061  -0.2110* 0.1524* 0.0604 -0.1380* -0.1400* 0.0435 0.0916* -0.1467* 1      
RER 
570 453 539 420 425 570 524 576 590 548 595      
-0.2736* 0.0438  -0.1409* 0.1159* 0.1101* -0.0984* -0.0652 0.0139 0.0358 -0.0800 0.5579* 1    
INFL 
573 458 545 424 429 576 527 582 596 547 593 601    
0.2311* 0.3460* 0.2757* -0.2526* -0.1846* 0.2935* 0.0979* 0.2237* -0.0443 0.1250* -0.2129* -0.1731* 1 
CPIA 
530 439 523 416 421 531 497 521 527 498 527 532 532 
Note: A star means a 5% level of significance, the second row shows the number of observations. 
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Table 3A: Pairwise correlations, LICs 
LIC GROWTH  GDP(-1)  LTDSGDP NPVDXTS 
(-1) 
NPVDGDP
(-1)  LINV  PUBINV  PEDUC  TOT REV RER INFL  CPIA 
1                        GROWTH 
248                      
-0.2866*  1                     GDP(-1) 
197  197                    
0.0390  0.0917 1                   LTDSGDP 
237  195 237                  
-0.0554  -0.1768* -0.0701 1                 NPVDXTS(-1) 
184  184 184 184                
-0.1915*  0.0589 0.2474* 0.7894* 1               NPVDGDP(-1) 
186  186 186 184 186              
0.2086*  0.2046* 0.1916* -0.0796 0.0099 1              LINV 
248  197 237 184 186 248             
0.1692*  -0.0936 0.0675 0.0236 -0.0014 0.5408* 1           PUBINV 
233  190 229 180 182 233 233          
0.0834  0.3349* 0.0596 -0.1119 0.0032 0.1941* -0.0053  1         PEDUC 
242  196 234 184 186 242 230  246        
-0.1133 0.1512* -0.1462* 0.0032 0.0203 0.002 0.0339  0.0385 1        TOT 
248 197 237 184 186 248 233 246 253          
0.0458 0.0414 0.3021* -0.1260 0.1079* 0.4816* 0.5446* 0.0591 -0.0263 1         REV 
230 184 223 174 176 230 217 225 232 232        
-0.3638* 0.1019 -0.1733* 0.1133 0.0781
-
0.1504* -0.1752* 0.1072 0.1457* -0.1185 1       RER 
243 193 232 180 182 243 228 241 248 232 248      
-0.2549* 0.1762* -0.1019 0.0876 0.105 -0.0879 -0.0662 0.0307 -0.0131 -0.0612 0.5591* 1     INFL 
248 197 237 184 186 248 233 246 253 232 248 253    
0.1281* -0.015 0.3400* -0.0427 -0.064 0.3138* 0.2037* 0.0374 -0.0679 0.1953* -0.2665* -0.2522* 1 
CPIA 
237 194 232 184 186 237 226 233 237 225 232 237 237 
Note: A star means a 5% level of significance, the second row shows the number of observations. 
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